Defamation

Contributed by Shelley Eder, as amended by the Policy Division of the NT Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) and current to December 2025

Background

Defamation law exists primarily to protect against reputational damage from the publication of false statements whilst balancing the right to free speech.

Defamation law across Australia is uniform. This means that the laws in each state and territory are largely the same. In the Northern Territory, defamation law is set out under the Defamation Act 2006 (NT) ("Defamation Act").

In 2025, the Defamation Legislation Amendment Act 2025 (NT) ("Amendment Act") was passed through the Legislative Assembly. The Amendment Act brings the Act into line with the updated uniform amendments agreed by the States and Territories of Australia.

The objectives of the Defamation Act are:

• To promote uniformity between defamation law in the NT and other Australian States and Territories;
• To ensure the law of defamation does not place unreasonable limits on freedom of expression;
• To provide effective and fair remedies for persons whose reputations are harmed by defamation; and
• To promote speedy and non-litigious methods of resolving disputes about the publication of defamatory material (Defamation Act, s2).

Defamation

Who can bring a defamation action?

An individual or body must have legal personality to bring an action for defamation. In the Northern Territory the following may sue:

• Individuals
• Corporations with fewer than 10 employees that are not public bodies (Defamation Act, s8(2)(b))
• Corporations that are not formed with the object of obtaining financial gain for its members or corporators and are not public bodies (Defamation Act, s8(2)(a))

Where are cases heard?

In the Northern Territory actions in defamation may be commenced and heard in either the Local Court or Supreme Court, depending on the amount of damages claimed.

Proceedings

Defamation actions tend to be time consuming, expensive and lengthy. Court appearances and reliving hurtful events are often stressful and can have a significant emotional toll.

Further, there is the risk that an unsuccessful litigant will be held liable for the successful party’s legal costs.

Given the above, and the potential risk for adverse costs orders (see below), litigation should only be commenced after careful thought and expert legal advice.

Time Limit

A claim must be filed by an aggrieved person within one (1) year from the date the defamatory material was first published (Limitation Act 1981 NT, section 12(2)(b)). The date for calculating the limitation period will remain the first publication date even if the matter is republished in a similar form at a later date by the same publisher (the first publisher) or their associate. For electronic publications the date of first publication is the day on which the matter was first uploaded for access or sent electronically to a recipient.

The Defamation Act defines an associate of a first publisher as:

• An employee of the publisher;
• A person publishing matter as a contractor of the publisher; or
• An associated entity of the publisher or an employee or contractor of the associated entity.

The time limit may be extended by the Court for up to three years but only if the aggrieved person satisfies the Court that it is just and reasonable to allow an action to proceed.

The one year time limit is also extended by the serving of a Concerns Notice, if the notice is served within 56 days of the time limit expiring. If a Concerns Notice is served within that period, the time limit is extended by 56 days minus the number of days remaining until the time limit expires. For example, if a concerns notice is given 7 days before the time limit expires there would be 6 days left from the day after the day the concerns notice was given until the time limit expires. The time limit would therefore be extended by 56 days minus 6 days, that is, 50 days (Limitation Act 1981, section 44AA ).

Pre-litigation steps

Section 11B of the Defamation Act prevents a person from commencing defamation proceedings unless:

• The person has given a proposed defendant a Concerns Notice in respect of the publication; and
• The defamatory inferences the person intends to rely on in proposed proceedings are included in the concerns notice; and
• The applicable period for an offer to make amends has elapsed.

A Concerns Notice:

• a) must be in writing;
• b) provide details of the location of the alleged defamatory material (e.g. a web address);
• c) set out what the aggrieved person claims can be inferred or conveyed about them by readers of the alleged defamatory material (referred to as defamatory imputation(s));
• d) describes the serious harm caused, or that is likely to be caused, by the alleged defamatory material to the aggrieved person’s reputation; and
• e) where possible, provides a copy of the publication in question.

If the aggrieved person fails to provide the information referred to at (b) – (d) above in a Concerns Notice, the defendant may issue a notice to the aggrieved seeking further particulars (Further Particulars Notice).

The aggrieved must respond to a Further Particulars Notice within 14 days. If they fail to do so, the Concerns Notice is taken to not have been given.

Alternatively, the defendant may ‘offer to make amends’ (as set out by the Defamation Act) within 28 days after they receive a copy of the Concerns Notice.

What is Defamation?

Defamation law is designed to protect a person’s reputation.

In a court proceeding, the plaintiff would need to prove the following elements:

• material has been published;
• that identifies the plaintiff;
• the publication is defamatory; and
• the defamatory publication has or is likely to cause serious harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.

If the plaintiff can prove the above elements, then the onus shifts to the defendant to prove any of the defences (if applicable).

Publication of matter

What constitutes a publication?

Publication basically means the imputation was communicated to a third party (other than the plaintiff and the defendant) (Pullman v Walter Hill & Co Ltd [1890] UKLawRpKQB 193; [1891] 1 QB 524). Publication to single individual will suffice (Grappelli v Derek Block (Holdings) Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 272) although obviously the scope of the publication would be considered as to if the threshold for ‘serious harm’ has been met and if so, in the award for any compensation.

If the matter relates to a true innuendo (see below) the plaintiff must prove that the matter was communicated to at least one person who has knowledge of the special extrinsic fact(s).

What is ‘matter’?

Under section 3 of the Defamation Act, ‘matter’ is defined broadly, and includes:

• (a) An article, report, advertisement or other thing communicated by means of a newspaper, magazine or other periodical; and
• (b) A program, report, advertisement or other thing communicated by means of television, radio, the internet or any other form of electronic communication; and
• (c) A letter, note or other writing; and
• (d) A picture, gesture or oral utterance; and
• (e) Any other thing by means of which something may be communicated to a person.

Who can be liable for a publication?

Anyone who is involved in the publication, or even distribution of material may be liable, including corporations, employees and members of the public repeating defamatory statements. An action may not be maintained against a person who is deceased (Defamation Act, s9).

People posting on social media need to be aware that the law of defamation applies to them. There have been a number of cases in Australia where a person has successful sued an individual in regards to their social media costs (for example, Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295; Dabrowski v Greeuw [2014] WADC 175; Polias v Ryall & Ors [2014] NSWDC 1692).

The Amendment Act recently clarified that digital intermediaries can be held liable for defamation where they play an active role in the publication of the defamatory material.

‘Digital intermediary’ is defined by section 3 of the Defamation Act to be ‘a person, other than an author, originator or poster of the matter, who provides or administers the online service by means of which the matter is published.’ An online service that a digital intermediary operates includes virtually any digital platform, including social media platforms, review websites, search engines (such as Google) and members of the public that host community Facebook pages.

For example, a digital intermediary may be liable for defamation where:

• a search engine (e.g. Google) sponsors an ad that publishes defamatory material; or
• a Facebook page community host receives a complaint about a post that publishes defamatory material but does not remove the defamatory material.

Further, the Defamation Act provides an exemption from defamation liability to digital intermediaries whose role is limited to providing certain services, and search engine providers, who play only a passive role in the publication of material (for example search engine providers in relation to organic search results that are provided by an automated process and that have not been promoted or prioritised by the search engine for payment). This exemption will not apply if the digital intermediary played an active role.

Identification

In any court action, the person alleging defamation will have to demonstrate that the material identifies them. In many cases, this is very easy to establish, as the person will have been referred to by name, or a photo of them published.

Even if the publisher did not intend to identify the person, they may have still be inadvertently identified. A good example of this principle can be seen in the case Lee v Wilson [1934] HCA 60. In that case a newspaper article in Victoria referred to a corrupt Detective Lee. A the time there were three police officers with the name ‘Lee’ in Victoria. The court held that the article had potentially identified all of them.

It is not generally sufficient if the person is referred to as a member of a group (for example, all lawyers are thieves) unless that group is a very small and identifiable group (for example, ministers of the Queensland parliament) (Bjelke-Peterson v Warburton [1987] 2 Qd 465).

A person might also be identified by unique facts, like their job title (for example, manager of a specific company), address, family relationship or other characteristics.

Material that seems defamatory is not actionable unless it can be established that the material in question refers to a particular person. Showing footage of a person’s house or place of business as the background to a story may be sufficient to give rise to the imputation that the story is about them (Henry v TVW Enterprises Ltd (1990) 3 WAR 474).

Defamatory Imputation

At law, all people are presumed to have a good reputation unless facts are proven in court to show that this should not be the case. Although there is no definitive legal definition of what a defamatory statement is, the following provides some legally accepted definitions that have been used by the courts:

• Material which would ‘tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally’ – Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237.
• ‘false statement about a man to his discredit’ – Scott v Sampson [1882] UKLawRpKQB 32; [1882] 8 QBD 491.
• ‘matter is defamatory if it tends to make a plaintiff shunned or avoided’ – Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581.
• ‘in general, an imputation, to be defamatory of the plaintiff, must be disparaging of him’ – Boyd v Mirror Newspapers [1980] 2 NSWLR 449.
• ‘that a statement or other representation has been made of a kind likely to lead ordinary decent folk to think the less of the person about whom it is made’ – Consolidated Trust Co Ltd Browne (1948) 49 SA (NSW) 86.

Material can also be defamatory if it exposes a person to ridicule (Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press (1991) 23 NSWLR 443) or if it is disparaging of a person’s professional reputation (Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 All ER 1094).

Defamation protects reputation, not pride. It is not enough for a person to show that they have been abused in some way. Mere ‘scurrilous abuse’, such as yelling out ‘[y]ou are a bloody infamous thief!’ is not defamatory (Hodgson v Bulpit 1880) 6 VLR (L) 400). But while obscenities, vulgarities and other verbal abuse will not, of themselves, constitute defamation, the line is fine; it has been held that a journalist describing a film director as ‘hideously ugly’ was defamatory because the comment gave the impression that the film director was not merely physically distasteful but actually an abhorrent person (Berkoff v Burchill [1996] EWCA Civ 564; [1996] 4 All ER 1008). Thus, whether a remark is defamatory will depend on such factors as the context in which it is made and to whom it is said.

The meaning of the publication is determined by the court by applying the ‘ordinary reasonable reader’ test. The question is, what would an ordinary reader (or viewer or listener) infer from the publication (see for example Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb [1982] HCA 4; (1982) 150 CLR 500 or Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 385)). The publication needs to be considered in it’s entire context, not just part of it (Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1995] UKHL 6; [1995] 2 All ER 313). So, for example, a defamatory headline will not of itself be defamatory if the article that follows is not; although if it is the front page and there are many publications of just the headline alone, with no explaining article, then the publication of the sole headline may be defamatory (Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 652).

Defamation may sometimes be communicated only to a select group of people who have knowledge of a special extrinsic fact; this is called ‘true innuendo’. An example of this is clearly demonstrated by a case that was brought at the turn of the century. A newspaper article printed the false claim that the plaintiff had just given birth to twins. This was not of itself defamatory, however it was to the select group of people who knew that the plaintiff had only been married weeks before (Morrison v Richie [1902] 4 Fraser Sess, Cas, 645).

Serious Harm

Section 9A of the Defamation Act provides a serious harm test for a claim of defamation. Under section 9A, the Court must determine whether a publication has resulted in serious harm to a person’s (including an excluded corporation) reputation, or whether that is likely to occur.

Serious harm is not defined by the Defamation Act. It is up to the judge to determine on the facts of each case whether serious harm to the aggrieved person’s reputation has occurred or is likely to occur.

While serious harm is not defined, the Courts have interpreted it so that hurt feelings or perceived harm will not be enough to establish serious harm. Tangible harm to the aggrieved person’s reputation (or the likely occurrence of such harm) must be proved for the serious harm threshold to be met.

The ‘serious harm’ threshold was introduced in the Northern Territory in 2025 and is yet to be applied by the judiciary in the Northern Territory. However, in other States and Territories in Australia, where the threshold of serious harm test is already applied, the Courts have relied on a number of factors to determine whether serious harm has occurred. These include but are not limited to:

• The audience of the publication, the number of recipients and their geographical placement;
• The recipients’ interpretation of the publication and whether the publication resulted in recipients having a diminished view of the aggrieved.
• Whether the recipients had prior knowledge or awareness of the aggrieved person’s reputation and what that was.
• The extent of the publication’s distribution, including any instances of republication or repetition;
• The format of the publication and how this affects the perceptions and interpretation of the publication’s content e.g. whether the publication occurred in a reputable newspaper or a social media post and what impact this had on the recipients’ views of its contents.
• Whether the harm suffered is transient or temporary.
• The timing of the publication and its duration.

Who must prove serious harm has occurred?

The aggrieved person who claims they have been defamed must prove that serious harm to their reputation has occurred or is likely to occur due to the publication of the alleged defamatory material.

What happens if serious harm has not been proven?

Defamation cannot be established unless the publication of the alleged defamatory material has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the aggrieved person’s reputation.

If the “serious harm” threshold is not satisfied, there can be no legal action in defamation and the proceeding before the Court will be dismissed.

When can “Serious Harm” be determined?

The Court can make a ruling on if serious harm to the aggrieved person’s reputation has occurred, or is likely to occur, before the final hearing for defamation commences.

This ensures that cases that do not meet the threshold are dismissed at an early stage without unnecessary costs to the parties and the court.

Repetition

It is not a defence to an action to defamation to say that you are merely repeating the words of another. Every republication of the defamatory matter creates a new cause of action in defamatory, with each publisher being answerable for his actions to the same extent as the original publisher (Trust (NZ) Ltd v Holloway [1960] WKR 997; McCauley v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1933] NSWStRp 65. Thus, the plaintiff will often sue both the originator as well as other parties who repeat the material (Gorton v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1973) 1 ACTR 6).

A publisher can also be made liable for the ‘natural and proximate’ consequences of the original publication. In the case of Sim v Wran [1984] 1 NSWLR 317 a politician was held liable for repetition in the media for statements he made during a press conference.

Defences

In litigation, once the plaintiff has established that defamation has occurred, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove any defences. The Defamation Act establishes a number of defences which operate in conjunction with common law defences (Defamation Act, s21). Some of the defences are related and may be argued simultaneously.

Triviality (section 30, repealed)

The defence of triviality was repealed by the Amendment Act in 2025. Is has been superseded by the requirement for an aggrieved person to prove that publication of defamatory matter about them has caused serious harm to their reputation, or is likely to cause serious harm to their reputation,

Justification/truth (section 22)

This defence will apply where the defendant proves that the defamatory meaning is true or substantially true (Defamation Act s22). The rules of evidence will apply if the defendant is trying to establish this defence in court.

Truth refers to the substance of the defamation, rather than the accuracy of all stated facts. For example, if a newspaper article stated that a person had robbed Bank X when in reality they had robbed Bank Y, the defendant could still rely on justification, because the imputation that the person has robbed a bank can be proved substantially true.

If a publication makes a number of defamatory allegations, the defendant must prove the truth of each in order for this defence to completely succeed. If only some of the allegations are proven true it may result in a lower compensation award for the plaintiff.

Contextual truth (section 23)

Similar to the defence of justification, the rationale for this defence is that the publication does no further harm to the plaintiff's reputation. It arises in case where:

• a) the publication contains more than one defamatory imputation
• b) the defendant succeeds in proving the truth of at least one of the imputations
• c) (usually because of the seriousness of the proven imputation) the unproven imputation does no further damage to the plaintiff's reputation.

Case Study

A well-known author had publicly admitted on a number of occasions that he was a holocaust denier, therefore already having a very damaged reputation. The court held that it would do no further harm to his reputation to say that he was a bad historian, even if the latter could not be proven: Irving v Penguin Books Ltd [2000] EWHC QB 115.

Absolute privilege (section 24)

In some situations, there is complete immunity from liability for defamation. These are occasions in which the law recognises that there needs to be complete freedom of communication. The emphasis here is on the circumstances of the communication rather then the subject matter. The following situations are covered by absolute privilege:

• Communication in the course of parliamentary proceedings (otherwise known as parliamentary privilege). This applies only top proceedings before the House, while the House is in session and nay communication outside the scope of this (e.g. a press interview outside the house or a conversation when parliament is not in session) will not be covered by privilege.
• Communication in the course of court or tribunal proceedings. Judges, lawyers, parties or anyone giving evidence while a court, tribunal or royal commission is in session is covered by privilege.
• Communication between lawyers and their clients, as long as the communication is related to the professional relationship rather than idle gossip (More v Weaver [1928] 2 KB).
• Communications between executives of High Office, for example Ministers of the Crown or Heads of State.
• Communication between husband and wife.
• Communications to a person who, at the time of the publication, is an official of a police force or service of an Australian jurisdiction, and it is published to the official while the official is acting in an official capacity.

There is no way to defeat this defence if the defendant proves the communication was on an occasion of absolute privilege.

Publication of public documents (section 25)

This defence is covered in the Defamation Act at s25. Generally it will be a defence if the publication can be shown to be a repetition, summary or fair report of information contained in a public document. The documents classified as 'public documents' for this purpose are listed in the Defamation Act s25(4) and include court judgments, reports tabled in Parliament and documents open for public inspection.

If the publisher does embellish or significantly change the document they risk losing the privilege: Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Ltd [2008] ACTSC 69. Minor inaccuracies will not defeat the defence - substantial accuracy is enough.

The Defamation Act s25(3) states that this defence can be defeated '...if, and only if, the plaintiff proves that the defamatory matter was not published honestly for the information of the public or the advancement of education.'

Fair report of proceedings of public concerns (section 26)

This defence is covered in the Defamation Act at s26. It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that the matter was, or was contained in, a fair report of proceedings of public concern.

In order to prove this defence the defendant must show that the matter was contained in an earlier published report. A report of proceedings of public concern is defined in s26 in very broad terms and includes things like reports of parliamentary proceedings, reports of public meetings and conferences of learned societies and shareholder meetings. The publication needs to be contained in a fair report of proceedings in question. The Defamation Act s26(3) states that this defence can be defeated '...if, and only if, the plaintiff proves that the defamatory matter was not published honestly for the information of the public or the advancement of education.'

Matters concerning public interest (section 26A)

A defendant will have a defence to defamation if they can prove that the publication concerned an issue of public interest, and the defendant reasonably believed the publication was in the public interest.

It is at the discretion of the Court to decide if the matter concerned was one of public interest. In determining whether the defence is established, a court must take into account all of the circumstances of the case. Section 26A(3) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that a court may take into account in determining whether the defence applies.

This defence was intended to be broader than the defence of qualified privilege, so as to cover broader forms of communications (e.g. media publications) that are in the public interest.

Qualified privilege (section 27)

Qualified privilege gives a limited protection to some forms of communication. It arises where there is a legal, moral or social duty to communication something to a person or organisation with an interest in the information. The focus is on the occasion of the publication and the nature of the assertion made. Qualified privilege will rarely be applicable in the case of publication to the public at large.

There are no rigid categories that define occasions of qualified privilege. The defendant must show that the recipient has a particular and specific interest in receiving the information (see for example, Roberts v Bass [2002] HCA 57).

A common example of where the privilege arises is in relation to employment references. Where a prospective employer request a reference from a former employer, the contents of the reference may be covered by this privilege. Other examples could include communication between parents and teachers, or past and prospective creditors.

Unlike absolute privilege, this defence will be defeated if the plaintiff can show the defendant acted with malice. Malice in defamation law means the statement was made for a non-legitimate purpose. For example, if it can be shown that a former employer gave a bad reference in order to destroy a person’s career prospects, rather than giving an honest appraisal of the person’s work performance, then the defence would be defeated.

Section 27(3) of the Defamation Act provides a non-exhaustive list of factors for consideration when assessing if the defendant’s publication of the defamatory matter was reasonable in the circumstances.

Scientific or academic peer review (section 27A)

Where the alleged defamatory material is:

• published in a scientific or academic journal;
• relates to a scientific or academic issue; and
• has undergone an independent review by the editor of the journal who has expertise in the area in question or one or more persons who have expertise in the area in question,

the defendant will have a defence to any claim of defamation for that material.

However, a defence on this basis will not be available where it is proven that the alleged defamatory material within the scientific or academic journal was not done so honestly for the information of the public or advancement of education.

Honest opinion (section 28)

This is a defence under both common law and the Defamation Act. The defence seeks to protect a person’s right to freely express their opinions on matters of public interest or issues in the public domain. This is one of the ways the law seeks to protect freedom of speech within the law of defamation.

The words ‘in the public interest’ have been interpreted broadly by the courts and may include things like reviews (restaurant, hotel, entertainment etc.), opinions about the public conduct of public figures, character of public and court officials or performance of people who hold public positions (for example, Gardiner v John Fairfax and Sons [1942] NSWstRp 16).

Under the Defamation Act, the opinion expressed needs to be based on proper material. An opinion will be based on proper material if it meets the requirements set out at section 28(5) of the Defamation Act.

The defence covers statements of opinion only, as opposed to statements of fact. Thus, a defamatory statement that a person had committed a crime would not be covered, but a statement that a person was not very good at their job may be (Carleton v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2002] ACTSC 127).

Publications involving digital intermediaries (section 28A)

Where a digital intermediary (see above for defintion), such as an online forum administrator:

• provides an accessible complaints mechanism (e.g. an email address to lodge complaints); and
• takes steps to prevent access to the alleged defamatory material (e.g. by removing the matter in question from the forum website) either before receiving a complaint or within seven days after receiving a written complaint about the matter in question,

then the digital intermediary will have a defence to any defamation claim brought because of that alleged defamatory material.

If a written complaint has not been received about the alleged defamatory material in question, the digital intermediary will still have access to the defence if they can prove that they had an accessible complaints mechanism at the time the digital matter was published.

Innocent dissemination (section 29)

The defence of innocent dissemination protects those involved in the publication of material who have no knowledge or control over the content. It is covered by s29 of the Defamation Act.

It will apply if the defendant can prove that they published merely in the capacity, or as an employee or agent, of a subordinate distributor AND that they neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known that the matter was defamatory and that the lack of knowledge was not due to their own negligence [s29].

This defence covers entities such as booksellers and newsagents, libraries, live broadcasters, search engines and ISPs and their employees. The defence requires that the publisher be 'innocent', and therefore where the plaintiff has notified the publisher of the defamatory content, or the publisher has been made aware by some other means, the defence will not be available (e.g. Trkulja v Google Inc [2012] VSC 533).

Consent and acquiescence (common law)

The common law defence of consent and acquiescence is available as a defence to a defamation action. The defence is that the plaintiff implicitly or expressly consented to, assented to the publication of the defamatory imputation. For this defence to succeed the plaintiff's consent must be clear and unequivocal: Mihaka v Wellington Publishing Co (1972) Ltd (1975) 1 NZLR 10, Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443. For example, it is not enough to show that a plaintiff agreed to be part of a public discussion on a TV show or talkback: Syms v Warren (1976) 71 DLR (3d) 558.

Constitutional right to freedom of political discussion

The High Court has implied into the Constitution, a right to freedom of political communication. That means laws that unreasonably restrict communication on political matters may be declared unconstitutional. In the context of the law of defamation it means that communication on political matters MAY be covered by this defence (Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520).

What is 'political communication'?

Political communication has been interpreted fairly broadly, however the plaintiff must prove the communication was in regards to political matters or government. This could include discussions about the fitness of politicians for office and political parties, including international political issues [Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520] and communication in regards to candidates in an election (Roberts v Bass [2002] HCA 57; (2003) 194 ALR 161). The privilege may not include communication about judges or magistrates (Herald & Weekly Times Ltd & Bolt v Popovic [2003] VSCA 161, John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited v O'Shane [2005] NSWCA 164). Just because an organisation is publicly funded, does not mean it is covered by the privilege (Rowan v Cornwall (No 5) [2002] SASC 160).

Communication needs to be 'reasonable'.

In order for this defence to stand, the communication of the defendant needs to be reasonable in the circumstances. Some of the things that may make the communication unreasonable could include, publication to an unnecessarily wide audience, a failure to properly fact check the story, or give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond, or if it could be shown that the publisher has grounds to believe the imputations were not true, or that they were published with malice (Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520, *Hockey v Fairfax* Media Publications Pty Limited [2015] FCA 652).

Apologies (section 19)

An apology is not a defence to a claim of defamation, nor does it constitute an admission of fault or liability by the person who made it and is not relevant to or admissible as evidence on the determination of fault or liability [Defamation Act s19].

However, an apology or correction, especially if it is tendered at an early stage, may be taken into account when calculating the amount of damages (that is, an apology may decrease the amount of money the defendant may have to pay to the plaintiff) [Defamation Act s35].

Offers of Amends (section 17)

Part 3 of the Defamation Act deals with offers to make amends. If a publisher makes a reasonable offer of amends within 28 days of being given a concerns notice of the offending publication and this offer is not accepted, then this may later provide a full defence in any litigation. For an offer to be reasonable it must include an offer to publish a reasonable correction, and should include an offer to pay adequate compensation if the complaint warrants it (see Defamation Act ss11-18). A person who has been or may be involved in this process should seek legal advice as soon as possible.